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MANAGED CARE AND MANAGED SENTENCING-
A Tale of Two Systems 
T he daily injustices mount. The front line professionals who administer the system cry out for more discretion to depart from the 
rigid rules that bind them. Congress finally hears 
their call, and is poised to enact sweeping reforms. 
Are improvements in federal sentencing law on 
the way? Probably not in the near future. But the 
new Congress will surely take up proposals to regulate 
the managed health care industry, and the impending 
debate over a proposed "Patients' Bill of Rights" law 
offers important lessons for federal sentencing policy. 
At first blush, sentencing reform and health care 
reform have about as much to do with each other as 
Justice Breyer and Dr. Spock. But take a closer look 
and some interesting if imperfect parallels become 
apparent: 
• The sentencing and health care systems deliver two 
of the most highly valued goods in American life: 
justice and medicine. Courtrooms and emergency 
rooms dominate the headlines, the congressional 
agenda, and even prime time television. 
• Both systems are administered by highly educated 
professionals. Judges and doctors are prized for the 
wisdom and discernment that years of experience 
provide, although members of both professions are 
sometimes perceived as unaccountable. 
• Both justice and health are theoretically available to 
all and unwarranted disparity among similarly 
culpable defendants or similarly symptomatic 
patients is an evil both systems strive to avoid. As a 
practical matter, however, the instruments of 
punishment (prisons, probation officers) and of 
health care (pharmaceuticals, hospitals) are finite 
and expensive commodities. Either explicitly or 
implicitly, society rations expenditures on both of 
these goods. 
• Both the sentencing and health care systems tend 
to one individual at a time, but society has a huge 
stake in the sentence imposed on each criminal and 
the medical care provided to each patient. The 
punishment of offenders provides society with 
general deterrence and incapacitation of dangerous 
individuals in the same way that the treatment of 
sick people bolsters public health and contains 
infectious diseases. The community benefits when 
the fair and effective treatment of one of its 
members leads to rehabilitation following either 
wrongdoing or sickness, just as it suffers from 
recidivism or relapse. 
Even the sentencing-related federalism issues 
discussed elsewhere in this Issue arise in the health 
care system as well. Both systems have a history of 
shared federal and non-federal responsibilities, but in 
both the federal role is expanding. Medical care for 
the indigent, traditionally a local concern, is now 
jointly subsidized by the federal and state govern-
ments through the Medicaid program, while health 
care for the elderly is largely carried out through the 
federal Medicare program. These massive federal 
health programs were enacted in the 1960's, just a 
few years before the federal government first 
asserted itself in street-level crime control. That's the 
same period in which the federal government 
dramatically increased its financial support to and 
influence over state and local criminal justice systems, 
as well as state and local public health agencies. 
State health officials, like their law enforcement 
counterparts, welcome federal resources but resent 
federal interference. They have argued, generally 
with success, that the federal government is ill-suited 
to administer the health programs it funds. Thus, the 
federal government has not usurped state and local 
control of health care in the way that it has increas-
ingly done so in criminal justice. When the federal 
government mandates Medicaid coverage of a medical 
condition, for example, it carries out the policy 
through state and local agencies. 
One reason why the federal role in health care is 
less controversial than the federal role in sentencing 
is that health care is still largely - despite the advent 
of Medicaid and Medicare - a private sector activity, 
while sentencing is a purely governmental function. 
Criminal sentences are imposed by government 
officials applying a body oflaw. In the case of federal 
sentencing, Congress itself (either directly or through 
its agent, the Sentencing Commission) writes the 
rules which guide judges. In contrast, most health 
care decisions in the United States are made by 
privately employed physicians acting pursuant to rules 
promulgated by private insurance companies. 
Congress' role in the health arena is not to rewrite 
those rules (although, as we will see, it has sometimes 
done that) but rather to regulate the interaction 
between insurance companies and doctors in order to 
protect the interest of patients. 
Still, today's managed care debate poses the same 
central question that Congress addressed in 1984 
when it restructured the federal sentencing system: 
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What is the proper balance between standardized decision 
making and individualized outcomes in a system that 
seeks to dispense a complex good to a large number of 
people in a fair, rational and cost-effective manner 
through professional decision makers? Whether the 
good is justice or medicine, and whether the decision 
makers are judges or doctors, Congress must resolve 
the inevitable tension between binding rules and 
professional discretion. 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 struck a 
sensible balance between the competing goals of 
standardized sentencing rules and individualized 
sentencing. Since then, federal sentencing policy has 
swung too far toward standardization and away from 
judicial discretion. Yet, even as Congress enacts more 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws which thwart 
individualized decision making, it moves to regulate 
managed care in order to reduce standardization and 
enhance the professional discretion of doctors. 
Why is Congress heading in one direction on 
health care and the opposite direction on sentencing? 
Does Uncle Sam's left hand not know what his right 
hand is doing? Does the American Medical Associa-
tion have more lobbying clout than the Federal Judges 
Association? Or is it just that every patient in the 
country is some Congressperson's valued constituent 
while criminal defendants are a despised minority? 
All of the above. But for a naively logical moment, 
let's examine the manner in which Congress is likely 
to strike a balance between standardization and 
individualization in the health care system in order to 
illustrate how it should restore that balance in the 
sentencing system. 
I. The Evolution of Managed Care 
The history of federal sentencing reform is well 
known to FSR readers but a brief review of the history 
of managed care may be useful to set the stage for a 
comparison of the parallel policy debates. 
Most Americans obtain health insurance through 
their employers, and large corporations typically 
subsidize the purchase of health insurance as a 
standard employment benefit. Until recently, most 
health insurance plans operated on a straightforward 
fee-for-service basis: the employee and his or her 
family members utilized doctors of their choice, paid 
for services out-of-pocket and then submitted receipts 
to the employer's insurance company for reimburse-
ment. Insurers engaged in very little cost contain-
ment; they made money simply because at any given 
moment they covered more young, healthy policy 
holders than old, unhealthy ones. 
Some employers, especially in the public sector, 
offered their employees a choice between fee-for-
service insurance and managed care. Under the 
managed care option, employees received services 
only from "preferred providers" or were enrolled in a 
health maintenance organization (HMO) and 
required to utilize doctors employed by the HMO. 
Although afforded less freedom to choose their 
doctors, employees opting for managed care paid 
lower insurance premiums than those in fee-for-
service plans and made no out-of-pocket payments 
except nominal co-payments at the time of service. 
HMOs made money by paying doctors lower fees in 
exchange for a guaranteed high volume of patients. 
During the 1980's, health care costs grew 
dramatically due to a variety of factors, including 
expensive new technologies and increased specializa-
tion by doctors. Employers scrambled to contain costs 
by raising premiums or eliminating altogether the 
more expensive fee-for-service option. They also 
pressed HMOs to reduce costs by managing health 
care benefits more aggressively. HMOs began 
reviewing and demanding pre-approval of the treat-
ment decisions of doctors in order to screen out 
"unnecessary" health care and thereby save employers 
money. Detailed rules were promulgated limiting the 
medical services eligible for reimbursement and 
constraining the circumstances under which patients 
could be referred to specialists. 
Doctors naturally chafed under this new regimen 
of review. After all, they had traditionally exercised 
vast discretion to treat their patients as they saw fit 
and were unaccustomed to having their professional 
judgment subject to challenge. They saw the 
managed care companies as distant, green-eyeshaded, 
bean-counting bureaucrats. Also, managed care was 
accompanied by complex, burdensome paperwork; 
doctors complained that they were so busy complying 
with the new rules that they had too little time to 
practice medicine. Sounds familiar? 
Managed care was almost reformed as part of 
President Clinton's ill-fated universal health care 
proposal. That plan would have expanded managed 
care and used the resulting cost savings to expand 
health insurance to all Americans, but it would have 
also instituted significant regulation of managed care. 
Health plans would have been subject to detailed 
quality controls and government oversight, and 
patients would have been permitted to appeal the 
denial of care to administrative bodies and ultimately 
to the courts. 
Congress rejected the Clinton plan for reasons 
beyond the scope of this article. Since then, economic 
forces have caused managed care to expand through-
out the health care market, but without comprehen-
sive regulation. Managed care has become more 
prevalent, more rigid and more hated by doctors and 
patients alike. 
Anecdotal evidence of specific managed care 
abuses have led legislatures to enact ad hoc patient 
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protections. For example, managed care policies 
calling for hospitals to discharge newborn children and 
their mothers from the hospital within 24 hours after 
birth led to an outcry against "drive-by" deliveries. A 
number of state legislatures passed laws mandating 
that insurance companies pay for no less than 48 
hours of hospitalization following childbirth, and 
Congress soon included that requirement in federal 
law. Other federal statutes mandate coverage for 
hospitalization following mastectomies, and prohibit 
certain restrictions on insurance coverage for mental 
illness that exceed restrictions on coverage for 
physical illnesses. 
These piecemeal reforms have led to calls for 
comprehensive managed care reform, including legal 
remedies for patients denied care they contend is 
medically necessary. Competing versions of the 
Patients' Bill of Rights legislation have surfaced in the 
last two years, and there is little doubt the current 
Congress will tackle this red-hot issue. 
II. Parallels Between Managed Care and "Managed 
Sentencing" 
Since the movement to reduce doctors' discretion and 
standardize health care decision making has come to 
be known as "managed care," sentencing guidelines 
and mandatory minimums might well be called 
"managed sentencing." 
Although they both blossomed in the 1980's, 
"managed care" and "managed sentencing" have 
different goals. Insurance companies utilize managed 
care to contain costs. The goals of managed sentenc-
ing are more complicated - early proponents of a 
sentencing guidelines system, such as Senator 
Kennedy, believed that the establishment of a body of 
sentencing law would help reduce unfair sentencing 
disparity, while Republican co-sponsors of the 1984 
Sentencing Reform Act saw guidelines (and subse-
quent mandatory minimums) as a means to lengthen 
criminal sentences. Whether the motive is fairness, 
crime control, or health care cost containment, 
standardization is meant to trump what is perceived to 
be the too disparate or lenient exercise of discretion 
by professionals "in the field" - judges and doctors. 
Advocates of standardized decision making tout 
the benefits of simplicity, clarity and (apparent) 
certainty. But attempts to impose overly rigid 
standards on professional decision making in complex, 
fact-bound fields like criminal justice and medicine are 
misguided. The effort often fails because sophisti-
cated decision makers are adept at finding ways 
around the rules. Thus, mandatory sentencing laws 
are not truly mandatory, since prosecutors, judges and 
defense attorneys can agree to permit sympathetic 
defendants who have committed offenses that carry a 
mandatory sentence to plead guilty to lesser or 
different offenses that do not carry a mandatory 
sentence. Similarly, doctors can evade insurance 
rules on behalf of their patients by falsely labeling as 
medically necessary procedures that are in fact 
elective or cosmetic, or by selecting a diagnosis that 
will lead to reimbursement instead of one that will 
not. 
Still, law and conscience limit the extent to which 
judges or doctors will manipulate the rules that 
purport to bind them. When those limits are 
reached, standardization yields grossly unfair results 
in individual cases and frustration results. Judges are 
precluded from imposing just sentences, doctors are 
precluded from practicing sound medicine, and the 
wheels of legislative reform begin to turn. 
Managed care reform, as we have seen, will never 
go so far as to abolish the rules that insurance 
companies impose on physicians. Since there is broad 
recognition that cost containment is a legitimate goal, 
reformers try to strike a balance between standardiza-
tion and medical discretion. For example, some 
proposals rewrite those rules to make them less 
restrictive (e.g., women get to stay in the hospital 
longer after giving birth), or they encourage depar-
tures from the rules (e.g., doctors are permitted to 
advise patients about treatment options outside the 
plan's coverage). Patients aggrieved by a decision 
under the rules (e.g., refusal to provide an experimen-
tal treatment) are afforded the right to appeal that 
decision to a higher authority. 
Structurally, then, managed care reform 
resembles the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act. 
Congress established a Sentencing Commission to 
write standards, but explicitly permitted judges to 
depart from those standards upon a finding of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances not antici-
pated by the rule makers. Then, to bolster standard-
ization, it permitted either party aggrieved by a 
departure to appeal that decision to a higher court. 
Unfortunately, the thoughtful sentencing 
structure established by the 1984 Act is crumbling 
from neglect. Beginning in 1986 and as recently as 
last October, Congress has enacted mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws that distort the guideline 
system and that are the antithesis of balance. An 
effort to redress the inflexibility of mandatory 
minimums - the 1994 safety valve amendment to 18 
U.S.c. 3553 - is itself overly prescriptive and depress-
ingly narrow. The guidelines are less rigid than the 
mandatories, but Congress repeatedly undermines 
the work of the Commission with overly specific 
statutory directives and by blocking Commission 
proposals to improve the guidelines. Meanwhile the 
Commission itself now has no members as a result of 
political wrangling between the Justice Department 
and the Senate. 
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Federal sentencing today is harsher and more 
unthinking than the most heavy-handed managed 
care rule ever imposed by an insurance company_ Just 
like overly rigid managed care, the sentencing rules 
are often evaded; when they cannot be evaded, they 
often result in needless pain and suffering_ If the 
pre-1984 sentencing system was, as Judge Frankel put 
it, law without order, the current system is order 
without justice. 
III. Lessons 
If concern about the excesses of managed care 
generates sensible reforms that strike a fair balance 
between insurance companies' legitimate need for 
standardization and the medical profession's right to 
exercise discretion in individual cases, that debate will 
have great relevance to the course of federal sentenc-
ingpolicy. 
One lesson of the managed care debate is easily 
applied to sentencing policy: mandatory sentencing 
laws are wrong. They should no longer be enacted, 
and they should all be repealed. Just as insurance 
mandates that arbitrarily cut off medical care without 
giving doctors the chance to take account of the 
unique needs of individual patients are wrong, so 
congressional mandates that impose punishment 
without giving judges the chance to take account of 
the unique circumstances of individual crimes and 
individual criminals are wrong. 
A second lesson is directed to the Sentencing 
Commission, should its new members ever be 
appointed. The current guidelines are too rigid, and 
provide for insufficient consideration of offender 
characteristics. The mere opportunity to depart from 
standards is not enough, for either judge or doctor. 
There must be genuine flexibility in the rules 
themselves, and a culture of decision making in which 
judicious adjustments based on unusual circum-
stances may occur without stigma or retribution. To 
be sure, there should always be an opportunity to 
remedy incorrect departures through appeal, but 
complex goods like justice or medicine cannot be 
dispensed in a mechanistic, cookie cutter fashion. 
The lesson of managed care and sentencing 
reform is not unique, indeed it is at the heart of our 
system of government. Most disputes in our society 
pose mixed questions oflaw and fact. All laws passed 
by Congress are in some sense standards, yet all are 
applied by administrative agencies and judges in 
individual cases. Any law so inflexible that it cannot 
be applied in a rational manner by wise decision 
makers in individual cases should be rewritten. 
Mandatory minimums, overly rigid sentencing 
guidelines and overly rigid managed care are all flawed 
because they pretend that somber and complex 
human decisions can be made based on law alone. 
Legislatures, sentencing commissions or insurance 
companies that seek to deprive judges or doctors of 
the discretion to apply the law or the rules to the facts 
of the case have unwisely arrogated too much power 
to themselves. 
Any decision making model that turns judges or 
doctors into mere technicians is especially foolish. 
The skill most prized in a judge or a doctor is sound 
judgment, and the essence of judgment is differenti-
ating one set of facts from another in order to make a 
wise decision. To a distant rule making body two 
patients or two criminals may look alike, but the 
skilled professional can tell them apart on close 
examination. It is no coincidence that doctors are 
leaving the practice of medicine and judges are leaving 
the bench in the face of twin schemes that deprive 
them of the ability to use their judgment. 
None of this is to deny that there are sound 
reasons for the rise of both managed care and 
sentencing guidelines. Medicine is too expensive 
these days for doctors to dispense without any 
accountability to third party payors. Well regulated 
managed care can help constrain health care costs 
without unduly compromising the quality of health 
care, just as guidelines can lead to more equitable and 
understandable sentencing decisions than the lawless 
"black-box" process that pre-dated the 1984 Act. 
But in the final analysis, only a doctor - not an 
insurance company - can treat a sick patient. And 
only a judge - not a legislature or an overzealous 
commission - can sentence a criminal defendant. 
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER· VOL. 11, NO.3· NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1998 
